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2026
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Source-derived question
How does a second-price sealed-bid auction, as designed by Vickrey, make it rational to bid your true valuation?
Mechanism Design and Auction Theory
Sources that address it
Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences
almanac
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