21 questions · 7 almanac · 0 findings

Mechanism Design and Auction Theory

Designing economic mechanisms and markets, including auctions.

Almanac Paying What You Think It's Worth
  • What problem was Mirrlees solving when he analyzed how a government should design income tax without observing citizens' true abilities?
  • How does a second-price sealed-bid auction, as designed by Vickrey, make it rational to bid your true valuation?
  • What common thread connects optimal taxation and auction design as economic problems of hidden information?
  • Why did Vickrey never get to collect his Nobel Prize?
Almanac Why the Lemon Market Collapses
  • What did Michael Spence mean by arguing that education can function as a signal rather than a source of ability?
  • How do uninformed parties design contracts to extract information from better-informed ones, according to Stiglitz's work?
Almanac Writing Rules Backward From the Outcome
  • What question does mechanism design ask that standard economic analysis does not?
  • Why does private information make designing effective economic rules so difficult?
  • Where is mechanism design theory applied today, such as in spectrum auctions or voting systems?
  • How old was Leonid Hurwicz when he received the prize, and why did that matter?
Almanac Theory Finds Its Practitioner
  • What is a stable matching, and what did Gale and Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm guarantee about it?
  • How did Alvin Roth redesign the National Resident Matching Program to eliminate last-minute scrambles?
  • How was matching theory extended from school placement systems to kidney exchange networks?
Almanac One Rulebook Does Not Fit Every Market
  • Why did the old regulatory toolkit of breaking up firms and capping prices fail for two-sided platforms?
  • What is mechanism design and how did Tirole apply it to industry-specific regulation?
  • How does platform economics explain why a firm might subsidise one group of customers to attract another?
Almanac Pricing the Winner's Curse
  • What is the 'winner's curse' in an auction with a common but uncertain value, like oil drilling rights?
  • How did Paul Milgrom extend Robert Wilson's auction theory to interdependent values across multiple auctions?
  • What practical problem led Milgrom and Wilson to design the simultaneous multiple-round auction format?
  • How much revenue has the simultaneous multiple-round auction format raised for governments allocating spectrum?